ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

. Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

. Fax: 202-493-2251.

. Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

. Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M- 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial

[Page Number 64893]

Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800- 0024).

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety/Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5353; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-146-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled "Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements" (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 ("SFAR 88," Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine- powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in- service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Boeing analysis determined that the existing wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump for Model 717-200 airplanes is routed within the "tire burst" area. Replacing the components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area, will minimize the possibility of wire damage and electrical arcing to the center wing fuel tank. A tire burst when the main landing gear (MLG) is in the retracted position might cause damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-29A0009, dated July 31, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the MLG. The modification includes replacing the components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 8 airplanes of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 11 work-hours per product to comply with this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts cost is minimal. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this proposed AD to the U.S. operators to be $7,040, or $880 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

[Page Number 64894]

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,

2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Incorporated by reference.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

[Section] 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends [Section] 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM- 146-AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by December 15, 2008.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-29A0009, dated July 31, 2008.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a tire burst when the main landing gear (MLG) is in the retracted position from causing damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

(e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

Installation/Re-Routing

(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the MLG by doing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-29A0009, dated July 31, 2008.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, ATTN: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety/Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627- 5353; fax (562) 627-5210; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 24, 2008.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8-25991 Filed 10-30-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

Vol. 73, No. 212

14 CFR Part 39; [Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-146- AD]; RIN 2120-AA64

Proposed Rules

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

* Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

* Fax: 202-493-2251.

* Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

* Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024).

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety/Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5353; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-146-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled "Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements" (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 ("SFAR 88," Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Boeing analysis determined that the existing wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump for Model 717-200 airplanes is routed within the "tire burst" area. Replacing the components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area, will minimize the possibility of wire damage and electrical arcing to the center wing fuel tank. A tire burst when the main landing gear (MLG) is in the retracted position might cause damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source in the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-29A0009, dated July 31, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the MLG. The modification includes replacing the components in the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump with new components, and routing the wire assembly installation outside of the tire burst area.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 8 airplanes of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 11 work-hours per product to comply with this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts cost is minimal. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this proposed AD to the U.S. operators to be $7,040, or $880 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,

2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Incorporated by reference.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

--This is a summary of a Federal Register article originally published on the page number listed below--

Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

CFR Part: "14 CFR Part 39"

RIN Number: "RIN 2120-AA64"

Citation: "73 FR 64892"

Document Number: "Docket No. FAA-2008-1155; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-146-AD"

Federal Register Page Number: "64892"

"Proposed Rules"

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 14, 2008.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846; Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024).

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Rathfelder, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5229; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on April 7, 2008 (73 FR 18725). That NPRM proposed to require inspecting the drive assembly of the aft elevator standby loop for interference between the clevis and bolt of the bellcrank assembly, correct orientation of the pull-pull cable clevis bolt, and excessive freeplay of the bellcrank assembly bearing, and corrective actions if necessary. That NPRM also proposed to require modifying the pull-pull cable clevis in the drive assembly of the aft elevator standby loop for certain airplanes.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We considered the comments received.

Request To Change Summary Section for Clarification

Boeing asks that the second sentence of the Summary section in the NPRM, which describes what is to be inspected, be changed as follows: "This proposed AD would require inspecting the aft elevator standby loop drive assembly of the elevator standby cable system for interference between the clevis and bolt of this bellcrank assembly, correct orientation of the pull-pull cable clevis bolt, and excessive freeplay of the bellcrank assembly bearing, and corrective actions if necessary." Boeing states that this would more accurately describe the drive assembly being inspected since there are two drive assemblies in the elevator standby cable system.

We agree that the description in the Summary section of the AD should be clarified. Therefore, we have changed the Summary section and all other relevant sections in the AD to meet the commenter's intent.

Requests To Extend Compliance Time

Midwest Airlines asks that the compliance time in the NPRM be changed to one of the following: "Complete the inspection and modification within 27 months of the effective date of the AD," or "Complete the inspection and modification within 3,000 flight hours or 27 months, whichever occurs later from the effective date of the AD." Midwest Airlines states that it currently has a utilization of 3,450 flight hours per year, and if the compliance time is not changed, it would require compliance for all its airplanes in less than one year. Midwest Airlines also states that it checked some of its airplanes for the interference and none was found.

Air Tran proposes that the inspection and clevis replacement specified in the NPRM be done concurrently at 27 months after the effective date of the AD, rather than the inspection being limited to 3,000 flight hours. Air Tran states that since similar access is required for both the inspection and clevis replacement, it is more practical to accomplish the clevis replacement at the same time as the inspection. Twenty-seven months aligns with the Model 717 maintenance program heavy maintenance visits, but 3,000 flight hours does not.

We agree to extend the compliance time for performing the inspection for the reasons provided by the commenters. We have determined that a compliance time of within 3,000 flight hours or 27 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurs later, is appropriate and will ensure an acceptable level of safety. We have changed paragraph (f)(1) of this AD accordingly. The compliance time for doing the clevis modification specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD remains the same. Changing the compliance time for the inspection provides the opportunity to do the inspection and modification at the same time.

Request To Change Cost Section

Midwest Airlines states that the work-hour estimate specified in the Costs of Compliance section of the NPRM is underestimated. Midwest Airlines notes that the NPRM specifies 1 work-hour for the inspection and the referenced service bulletin specifies 2.4 to 11.9 work hours. Midwest Airlines adds that the NPRM specifies 4 work-hours for the modification and the referenced service bulletin specifies 5.4 work-hours. Midwest Airlines believes the service bulletin is more accurate than the NPRM.

From this comment, we infer that Midwest Airlines would like us to increase the work-hour estimate given in the NPRM. We do not agree. The cost information below describes only the direct costs of the specific actions required by this AD. Based on the best data available, the manufacturer provided the number of work hours (1 for the inspection, 4 for the modification) necessary to do the required actions, as specified in the service bulletin. We recognize that, in doing the actions required by an AD, operators might incur incidental costs in addition to the direct costs. The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions, however, typically does not include incidental costs such as the time required to gain access and close up, time necessary for planning, or time necessitated by other administrative actions. Those incidental costs, which might vary significantly among operators, are almost impossible to calculate. We have made no change to the AD in this regard.

Conclusion

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect 123 airplanes of U.S. registry.

It will take about 1 work-hour per product to do the inspection. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the inspection required by this AD to the U.S. operators to be $9,840, or $80 per product.

It will take about 4 work-hours per product to do the modification. Required parts will cost about $163 per product. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the modification required by this AD to the U.S. operators to be $59,409, or $483 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

--This is a summary of a Federal Register article originally published on the page number listed below--

Final rule.

CFR Part: "14 CFR Part 39"

RIN Number: "RIN 2120-AA64"

Citation: "73 FR 51908"

Document Number: "Docket No. FAA-2008-0407; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-002-AD; Amendment 39-15662; AD 2008-18-05"

Federal Register Page Number: "51908"

"Rules and Regulations"