By George

George Du stated: "Jingwei's current stock price does not reflect the growth, improved profitability and development the Company has experienced over the last year. Jingwei is positioned as the leading marketing link between the exciting Chinese marketplace and global commerce. As we witness the growth in internal consumption and the telecom industry is experiencing consolidation while adding new 3G service, we believe there will be an increasing demand for Jingwei's data mining and integrated marketing services including: interactive mobile, telemarketing, direct mail and new media".

Trading in Jingwei's common stock is reported on the OTCBB under the Symbol "JNGW". Jingwei recently filed an application with NASDAQ with respect to the listing of its common stock on that exchange.

About Jingwei International Limited

Jingwei International Limited ("Jingwei") is a leading integrated marketing company in the fast growing Chinese market. The Company specializes in data mining and customer relationship marketing services in China. Powered by advanced data mining technology and a proprietary database of over 300 million Chinese consumers, Jingwei enables leading Chinese companies as well as international brands to reach their target audiences. The Company's services include market segmentation, customer trend, revenue analysis and direct marketing. Jingwei is evolving into an integrated marketing service provider with targeted campaigns via multi media channels including: interactive mobile, telemarketing, direct mail and new media. For more information, please visit the Company's web site: http://www.jingweicom.com .

Safe Harbor Statement

Certain of the statements made in the press release constitute forward- looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as "believe," "expect," "may," "will," "should," "project," "plan," "seek," "intend," or "anticipate" or the negative thereof or comparable terminology. Such statements typically involve risks and uncertainties and may include financial projections or information regarding our future plans, objectives or performance. Actual results could differ materially from the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements as a result of a variety of factors, including the risks associated with the effect of changing economic conditions in The People's Republic of China, variations in cash flow, reliance on collaborative retail partners and on new product development, variations in new product development, risks associated with rapid technological change, and the potential of introduced or undetected flaws and defects in products, and other risk factors detailed in reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time.

    For more information, please contact:

    Investor contact:
     Strategic Growth International, Inc.
     Miri Segal / Richard Cooper
     Tel:   +1-212-838-1444
     Email: msegal@sgi-ir.com / rcooper@sgi-ir.com

SOURCE Jingwei International Limited

http://www.jingweicom.com

The domestic policy brief on the financial crisis calls for additional federal spending to help endangered businesses accompanied by reforms. The health reform brief recommends a compromise step-by-step approach - the kind that has worked at the state level.

Foreign Policy and National Security Recommendations, In Brief

Secretary of State: To restore U.S. international standing, begin by embracing treaties such as Kyoto and the International Criminal Court; renew multi-level, expert negotiations on a limited range of topics of mutual concern with allies and adversaries; and demonstrate to key allies, especially in Europe and Asia that we are serious about consultation and cooperation. Catherine M. Kelleher,http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/Kelleher.htm

National Security Adviser: A vital role, second only to the president, in determining the success or failure of the next administration's foreign policy. The president should pick someone who will follow the example of Bush 41's adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and build trust and interagency cooperation with other cabinet members and advisers, as well as a close relationship with the president. Mac Destler, http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/destler/ and Ivo Daalder, http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/daalder/daalder.htm

Defense and National Security: To meet the changing nature of our security threats, a former top Pentagon official calls for a major "cultural change" in our national security and defense operations, creating a much greater level of integration of Defense, Homeland Security, State and Treasury coordinated through the president and his national security adviser. The financial crisis will limit spending. Jacques Gansler, http://www.puaf.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/gansler.html

Peacekeeping and Defense: The changing nature of security threats will require more military "stability operations" - peacekeeping operations, for example; efforts to return civil order rather than defeating an enemy. While the Department of Defense has recognized the need and begun to integrate State Department civil and humanitarian resources into its new Africa Command, this does not go far enough. Evidence shows that these types of military operations are most successful in support of a political settlement. This translates into a need for expanded diplomatic and humanitarian resources. Daniel Levine, http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/Levine.htm

Domestic Policy Recommendations, In Brief

Treasury secretary/financial crisis: Don't take this job without the full trust and support of the president. The first order of business: provide additional federal funds to distressed businesses, accompanied by reforms. Carmen Reinhart, http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/

Health care reform: Congress should quickly enact a series of small step compromises incorporating elements of both candidates' health care plans. Jack A. Meyer, http://www.healthmanagement.com/bio.asp?id=45

The six short readable essays are available online: http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/news/fall08-PubPolforWEB.pdf

See below for bios and contact information.

Some Specific Recommendations

I. ADVICE TO THE NEXT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Carmen Reinhart, University of Maryland economist, an expert in financial crises and co-author of a forthcoming book on the history of financial crises.

"The most important single piece of advice for anyone who might be tapped to be the next secretary of the treasury is simple: Do not take the job unless the authority and influence associated with having the trust of the president comes with it. Under those conditions it can be an important, indeed critical assignment at a time of great national need."

Reinhart adds:

- The first order of business may well be to provide additional federal funds to distressed businesses. "My research suggests that the longer that infusion is delayed, the higher ultimately will be the resolution cost." These expenditures may severely limit ambitious spending plans and tax relief proposed during the campaign.

- Such aid will only be tolerated if accompanied by significant financial reforms.

- The average drop in economic output is over two percent and recovery takes about two years.

- "We should not go backward in the decade-long efforts to strengthen the international trading system."

II. HEALTH CARE REFORM IN 2009

Jack A. Meyer teaches health policy in the School of Public Policy and the University's School of Public Health.

"Presidents from both parties have proposed 'grand designs' with many moving parts for about 60 years, all without success in the legislative area...States...have achieved much progress through step-by-step approaches with bipartisan support. It may be time for federal policy makers to do likewise."

Meyer proposes that Congress could combine elements from each of the candidate's plans and enact small but important steps:

- Reauthorize the State Children's Health Insurance Program for 10 years in 2009. Neither presidential candidate would want to veto such an effort so early in office.

- Republicans must agree to new public coverage limited to the poor while Democrats must agree to tax incentives to boost private market coverage.

- Help states set-up "insurance exchanges" along the lines of the program in Massachusetts.

III. NEW SECRETARY OF STATE: "BACK TO THE FUTURE"

Catherine M. Kelleher is a College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy and senior advisor to the Geneva Center on Security Policy.

To the secretary of state-designate: "You have little to build on from the last eight years...Your biggest challenge must be to restore the standing of the past...The easiest arena for instant credibility will not be a rapid round of travel but an enthusiastic embrace of treaties...Kyoto and climate change are obvious priorities..."

Kelleher offers "basic prescriptions for action," to re-energize America's post-World War II tradition of international engagement, democratic norms and serious diplomacy, such as:

- Make diplomacy the administration's international interest of first resort - "speak softly but clearly first" and use force as a last resort.

- Return to JFK's principle: never fear to negotiate or negotiate out of fear alone. Foster careful, regular and expert multilevel discussions on a limited set of topics with friends and adversaries.

- Rediscover the effectiveness of multilateralism and show key allies, especially in Europe and Asia, that we are serious about consultation and cooperation.

IV. WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER MUST DO

I.M. "Mac" Destler and Ivo Daalder. Destler is the Saul I. Stern Professor and director of the School of Public Policy's Program on International Security and Economic Policy. Daalder is a professor of public policy at the school and a senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

"No individual, save the president, will be more important to the success or failure of the next administration's foreign policy than the next assistant to the president for national security affairs."

Destler and Daalder argue that the job of president's national security adviser is vital because she or he sits at the "crossroads of power." The say that a successful national security advisor will follow the "Scowcroft Formula" - the approach used by George H.W. Bush's adviser, Brent Scowcroft.

- Quickly establish a trusting relationship with the president's other advisers and cabinet members, meeting regularly with them, scrupulously reporting their views fully and faithfully to the president, and not intruding on their jobs.

- Build interagency cooperative policy making in the government.

- Get close to the president.

V. ADDRESSING 21st CENTURY SECURITY

Jacques S. Gansler, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, is a professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy.

"The security world has changed dramatically...Perhaps the most obvious is the change from the bipolar, relative stability of the Cold War to the extreme unpredictability of worldwide security conditions today (requiring agility, rapid responsiveness and broad-based capability). In addition, it is clear that future security concerns will be multiagency and multinational."

Gansler calls for a "significant cultural change" on the part of the security community to adjust to the 21st century realities, all the while recognizing that the nation's financial crisis will reduce discretionary defense funding and Bush-era annual supplementals. To bring about this cultural change, he proposes:

- An integrated national security strategy of the departments of State, Defense Homeland Security, Intelligence and Treasury led directly by the president and his national security adviser.

- A series of internal Department of Defense restructuring.

VI. PEACEKEEPING RESOURCES

Daniel H. Levine is an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy and an assistant research scholar in the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy

"If we continue to think that building America's might means only building America's military, we are in real danger of losing the next decade's important wars."

Levine argues that our military has mastered conventional maneuver warfare, yet is unlikely to spend most of its time engaged in these fights. Indeed the Department of Defense has made "stability operations" a core priority. These involve a range of operations from peacekeeping to counter-insurgency. Generally they involve lower levels of force and focus on restoring order and security to the civilian population rather than defeating an enemy.

This involves more than simply integrating civil and humanitarian aid resources from the State Department into the military operation. In the context of stability operations, military force tends to be successful when used in support of an existing political arrangement.

"The next administration, if it is serious about making the U.S. military effective in stability operations, needs to recognize that establishing peace and security requires putting military force in a broader political context. Force can be used to convince armed groups to remain within the process, but it cannot substitute for genuine resolution of the conflicts that led to violence in the first place...Our first priority should be finding a way of reconciling parties to the conflict, not identifying enemies to defeat. This means expanding our diplomatic and humanitarian resources..."

AUTHORS' BIOS

Carmen M. Reinhart is professor of economics in the School of Public Policy and the university's Department of Economics. She is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a research fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Reinhart served as chief economist and vice president at Bear Stearns and as deputy director at the research department of the International Monetary Fund. Reinhart is writing (with Kenneth S. Rogoff) a book on the history of financial crises, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/

Jack A. Meyer teaches health policy in the School of Public Policy and the university's School of Public Health. He is a principal with Health Management Associates in the Washington, D.C., office, conducting health care research, policy analysis and strategic planning for clients. He works with grant-making foundations, health industry leaders, and state and federal agencies. http://www.healthmanagement.com/bio.asp?id=45

Catherine M. Kelleher is a College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy and senior advisor to the Geneva Center on Security Policy. She has taught and written extensively on conventional and nuclear arms control as well as on German, Russian and European security issues. She has authored more than 60 books and articles. Her government service has spanned periods on the National Security Council, in the Department of Defense and on panels of the National Academies of Sciences. She is the founder of Women in International Security, and has served on advisory and research boards of institutes and nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Germany. http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/Kelleher.htm

I.M. "Mac" Destler is the Saul I. Stern Professor and director of the School of Public Policy's program on international security and economic policy. He is a Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, publisher of Destler's prize-winning American Trade Politics (fourth edition, 2005). His other books include Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (with Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake). http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/destler/

Ivo H. Daalder is a College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He served on President Clinton's National Security Council staff in 1995-96. He has published widely, including (with James M. Lindsay) the award-winning America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, and Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy. http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/daalder/daalder.htm

Jacques S. Gansler, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, is a professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, and is the director of both the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the Sloan Biotechnology Industry Center. As the third-ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Gansler was responsible for all research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, environmental security, defense industry and numerous other security programs. http://www.puaf.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/gansler.html

Daniel H. Levine is an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy and an assistant research scholar in the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, specializing in moral and philosophical issues surrounding international law, civil conflict and peacekeeping operations. Levine also works with the education and training program of the U.S. Institute of Pace, where he has overseen work with the Iraqi higher education community and developed raining courses in ethics and conflict prevention. His most recent publication is African Civilian Police Capacity for International Peacekeeping Operations, released b the Henry L. Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program in February 2008. http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/Levine.htm

SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

The University of Maryland's School of Public Policy is a graduate school of public policy, management and international affairs that is nationally recognized for its excellent faculty, innovative curriculum, and leadership in the education of public policy professionals. http://www.puaf.umd.edu

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ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration: Any petitions for reconsideration related to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, may be submitted by any of the following methods:

. Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for submitting comments.

. Fax: 202-493-2251.

. Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.

. Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Note that all petitions received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov including any personal information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary Information section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted petitions, comments, or materials.

Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or to Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Wilson, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power and Equipment Division, RRS-14, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6259); or Jason Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6032).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Since the inception of automatic air brakes by George Westinghouse in the 1870s, brake signal propagation has been limited by the nature of air and the speed of sound. Other adjustments have sought to alleviate this deficiency, but have left the basic system unaltered. As early as 1990, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) began investigating more advanced braking concepts for freight railroads, including ECP brake systems, which promise to radically improve brake propagation by using electrical transmissions of the braking signal through the train while still using air pressure in the brake cylinder to apply the force of the brake shoe against the wheel. During the past 15 years, ECP brake technology has progressed rapidly and has been field tested and used on trains operating in revenue service by various railroads.

FRA has been an active and consistent advocate of ECP brake system implementation. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR initiative to develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded, through Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of ECP brake systems based on the AAR standards. FRA also took part in programs to develop and enhance advanced components for ECP brake systems.

To further assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail freight industry, FRA contracted Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) in 2005 to conduct a study. BAH engaged an expert panel consisting of principle stakeholders in ECP brake technology conversion to participate in the study. The expert panel made various conclusions relating to technological standards, safety, and efficiency. In addition, the final BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and comparison of ECP and conventional air brake systems. On August 17, 2006, FRA announced in a press release its intention to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the federal brake safety standards to encourage railroads to invest in and deploy ECP brake technology. In the press release, FRA encouraged railroads to submit ECP brake implementation plans before the proposed rule changes were completed.

In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006, two railroads--the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)--jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in parts 229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP brake pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. FRA held a public fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake manufacturers, and labor unions and granted a conditional waiver on March 21, 2007. See id.

On September 4, 2007, FRA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) containing proposed revisions to the power brake regulation. See 72 FR 50820. In the NPRM, FRA proposed revisions to the regulations governing freight power brakes and equipment by adding a new subpart addressing ECP brake systems. The proposed revisions were designed to provide for and encourage the safe implementation and use of ECP brake system technologies. The proposed revisions contained specific requirements relating to design, interoperability, training, inspection, testing, handling defective equipment, and periodic maintenance related to ECP brake systems. The proposed rule also identified provisions of the existing regulations and statutes where FRA believed flexibility to facilitate the introduction of this advanced brake system technology was necessary.

Following publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register , FRA held a public

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hearing in Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and a public hearing in conjunction with a public technical roundtable in the Chicago, IL area on October 19, 2007. The purpose of the hearings was to receive oral comments regarding the specific provisions contained in the proposed rule and to receive evidence and to develop findings to determine whether FRA should invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to provide a limited exemption from [Section] 20303 for freight trains and freight cars operating with ECP brake systems. Section 20303 requires operators to transport rail vehicles with defective or insecure equipment "from the place at which the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available place at which the repairs can be made" to avoid incurring civil penalties related to such movement.

The hearings were attended by numerous railroads, organizations representing railroads, labor organizations, and brake manufacturers. Although the comment period officially closed November 5, 2007, FRA continued to receive comments on the NPRM into January 2008. FRA received substantial oral and written testimony at the hearings and written comments to the NPRM from the following organizations, railroads, and brake manufacturers, listed in alphabetical order:

. American Association for Justice (AAJ).

. Association of American Railroads (AAR).

. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET).

. Brotherhood Railway Carmen Division, Transportation-Communications International Union (BRC).

. General Electric Transportation and General Rail Services (collectively, GE).

. New York Airbrake (NYAB).

. Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS).

. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (TWU).

. Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP).

. United Transportation Union (UTU).

. Wabtec Railway Electronics (Wabtec).

UTU supports and incorporates by reference the comments submitted by BLET, TCU, TWU, and its other labor representatives.

FRA carefully considered all the information, data and proposals submitted in relation to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175 when developing this final rule. In addition to the preceding information, FRA's knowledge and experience with enforcing the existing power brake regulations were also relied upon when developing this final rule. FRA will address and summarize all comments in the section-by-section analysis below and elsewhere as appropriate or necessary.

Based on the oral and written comments submitted at the hearing and in the docket to this proceeding, FRA makes the following findings: (1) Safety is not compromised by allowing a train operating with ECP brakes and having a minimal number of ineffective or inoperative defective brakes to travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, without any additional intermediate brake inspections; (2) the safety hazards caused by placing cars equipped with ECP brakes into a train with an incompatible brake system are no different than the hazards caused by placing a car equipped with conventional brakes with ineffective or inoperative brakes into a train operated with conventional brakes; (3) safety is not compromised by allowing a train operated with ECP brakes with at least 85 percent effective and operative brakes to haul a car with defective non-brake safety appliances to the nearest or nearest forward repair location; and (4) requiring strict compliance with the movement for repair provision contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 would constitute a significant disincentive to the implementation and use of ECP brake technologies. Based on these findings, FRA has elected to utilize its discretionary authority provided under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to provide a limited exemption for freight trains and freight cars operating with ECP brake systems from the requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303.

Subsequent to the close of the comment period in this proceeding, AAR modified two of its existing ECP brake standards, S-4200 and S-4210, and continued to develop standards regarding hardware and software configuration management issues for ECP brake systems. AAR sought comments from its members concerning a proposed standard S-4270 addressing the configuration management issues. As FRA is interested in incorporating by reference the most current standards into the final rule, FRA reopened the comment period on April 18, 2008, for an additional fifteen (15) days for the limited purpose of receiving comments on revised standards S-4200 and S-4210 and newly developed draft S- 4270. FRA continues to believe that reopening the comment period was the most efficient method of ensuring that the most current industry standards were included in this final rule.

The NPRM and this subsequent notice indicated that FRA intended to include S-4270 in the final rule if it was finalized by AAR with sufficient time for inclusion and if its final version remained substantially similar to the draft standard reference in the notice reopening the comment periods. Ultimately, AAR adopted S-4270 without any changes.

II. Conventional Brake Operations

While the basic operational concept of the automatic air brake system, originally conceived by George Westinghouse in the 1870s, remains the same, it has seen continuous improvement in practice. An air compressor in the locomotive charges a main reservoir to about 140 pounds per square inch (psi). With controls located in the locomotive, the locomotive engineer uses the main reservoir to charge the brake pipe--a 11/4 inch diameter pipe--that runs the length of the train and is connected between cars with hoses. The brake pipe's compressed air--used as the communication medium to signal brake operations and the power source for braking action--then charges each car's two- compartment reservoir to a pressure of 90 psi. Braking occurs through a reduction of air pressure in the brake pipe, which signals the valves on each car to direct compressed air from the reservoir on each car to its respective brake cylinder for an application of brakes. When air pressure is supplied to the brake cylinder--which is connected to a series of rods and levers that apply and release the brakes--the resulting force presses the brake shoes against the wheel, retarding the car's speed.

While brake applications were initially directed by George Westinghouse's triple valve, modern applications use a control valve, which directs air from the brake pipe into the air reservoir when air pressure is rising in the brake pipe in order to charge the auxiliary and emergency reservoir and be ready for a brake application. To perform a brake application, the locomotive automatic brake valve reduces air pressure in the brake pipe by exhausting air, causing the car's control valve to direct air from the auxiliary reservoir into the brake cylinder. The increase in air pressure to the brake cylinder is approximately 21/2 times the drop in brake pipe pressure. A 26 psi reduction in brake pipe pressure is equal to a full service brake application on a fully charged brake pipe, and should result in a brake cylinder pressure adequate to achieve a full service braking effort (brake force). While the control valve is directing air

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into the brake cylinder, or holding air in the brake cylinder, it is unable to recharge the auxiliary reservoir on each car. The engineer can apply the brakes in increments, of a few psi at a time, go directly to a full service application, or initiate an emergency application of the brakes.

Unlike a brake application, the incremental release of brakes on a typical freight train operating in direct release cannot be accomplished. Brakes can only be fully released, called a direct release, and only with the brakes released can the auxiliary reservoirs then begin to recharge. Brake applications are possible, but are more complicated, from undercharged brake pipe and air reservoirs. Recharging takes more time for a longer train, because the air has to be sent down the length of the train's brake pipe-- which can be up to a mile and a half. In addition, on extremely long trains, it is often difficult to fully charge the brake pipe due to small air leaks throughout the brake pipe and cold weather.

Brake pipe pressure can be measured by an end-of-train (EOT) device, which is pneumatically connected to the rear of a train equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes and sends signals (EOT Beacon) via radio indicating the brake pipe pressure to the lead locomotive. Current Federal regulations specify the design and performance standards for both one-way and two-way EOT devices. See Part 232, subpart E. Both EOT device designs comprise of a rear unit pneumatically connected to the rear of the train's last car that transmits an EOT Beacon to a an EOT Head End Unit--a device located in the cab of the lead locomotive displaying the brake pipe pressure of the rear car to the locomotive engineer. The two-way EOT device also has the capability to transmit an electronic signal from the locomotive to the rear end unit to initiate an emergency brake application by venting brake pipe pressure to atmosphere at the rear end unit.

An emergency brake application can be initiated in several ways. The locomotive engineer can initiate the application by moving the brake handle to the emergency position, which depletes brake pipe pressure to zero at a faster rate than the service application by exhausting brake pipe air pressure at the locomotive. Emergency brake applications can also be initiated by opening the conductor's valve, located in the cab of the locomotive, or by a break-in-two, where the train separates between cars and the brake pipe hoses separate, thereby venting brake pipe pressure to zero. While performing an emergency brake application from the locomotive, a locomotive engineer can also use the two-way EOT device to initiate an emergency brake application at the rear of the train. This permits the emergency application to be simultaneously initiated from both the front and rear of the trains and ensures that the brakes on the cars at the rear of the train apply in the event a brake pipe blockage occurs.

III. ECP Brake Operations

As early as 1990, AAR began investigating a more advanced braking concept for freight railroads, the ECP brake system. The ECP brake system radically improves the operation of the automatic air brake by using electrical transmissions to signal the application and release of brakes on each car in a train while still using compressed air to supply the air reservoirs on each car, which will be used to pressurize the brake cylinders to apply the force of the brake shoes against the wheels. ECP brakes also greatly simplify the brake system by eliminating multiple pneumatic valves used by conventional brakes and replacing them with printed circuit boards, each with a microprocessor, one electrically activated application valve, and one electrically activated release valve, with feedback on brake cylinder pressure for uniform control.

ECP brake technology requires equipping locomotives and cars with special valves and electronic equipment that are unique to the operation of ECP brakes. While this system still requires a brake pipe to supply compressed air from the locomotive to each car's reservoir in a train, there are currently two known methods to send the electronic signal for ECP brake operations from the locomotive to each car in the train. These methods include using a hard wire electrical cable running the length of the train or a radio-based technology requiring a transmitter and a receiver installed on the cars and locomotives. At this time, it appears that the railroad industry has chosen to use a cable-based system for ECP brake operation.

ECP brake systems still employ the automatic air brake system's basic concept where the locomotive supplies compressed air to each car's reservoir via the conventional brake pipe. Each car's brake valve reacts to a signal to apply the brakes by directing compressed air from the car's reservoir to the brake cylinder or to release the brakes by releasing air from the brake cylinder. The similarities between the conventional pneumatic and ECP brake systems end here. Instead of utilizing reductions and increases of the brake pipe pressure to convey application and release signals to each car in the train, ECP brake technology uses electronic signals, resulting in an almost instantaneous application and release of brakes on each car in the entire train. Since the brake pipe pressure no longer serves as the communication medium in ECP braked trains, the brake pipe is constantly being supplied or charged with compressed air from the locomotive regardless of whether the brakes are applied or released. In addition, ECP brake-equipped trains offer graduated release, where a partial brake release command provides a partial, proportional brake release.

The basic ECP brake system is controlled from the Head End Unit (HEU) and each car is equipped with a Car Control Device (CCD), an electronic control device that replaces the function of the conventional pneumatic control valve. The CCD acknowledges and interprets the electronic signals from the HEU and controls the car's service and emergency braking functions. The CCD controls charging the car's air reservoir and also has diagnostic capabilities to send a warning signal to the locomotive in the event any component fails to appropriately respond to a braking command. Each CCD has a unique electronic address located in the Car ID Module, which is keyed to a car's reporting mark and number.

Each car connects to the locomotive via special connectors and junction boxes. More specifically, an ECP brake-equipped train's train line cable--a two-conductor electric cable (#8 A-WG and a shield)--connects the locomotive and cars and carries train line power to operate all CCDs and the ECP brake system's end-of-train (ECP-EOT) device and communicates network signals via the power voltage. A Power Supply Controller (PSC)--mounted within the locomotive and providing 230 VDC of electricity--interfaces with the train line cable's communication network, provides power to all connected CCDs and ECP-EOT devices, and controls the train line power supply as commanded by the HEU. Under the AAR standards, a single power supply shall be capable of supplying power to an ECP brake-equipped train consisting of at least 160 CCDs and an ECP-EOT device.

Under the existing regulations, the conventional pneumatic brake system's EOT device can lose communication for 16 minutes and 30 seconds before the locomotive engineer is alerted. See 49 CFR 232.407(g). After the message is displayed, the engineer must restrict the speed of the train to 30 mph or stop the train if a defined heavy grade is involved. Per the regulations, railroads

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must calibrate each conventional two-way EOT device every 365 days and incur additional maintenance and cost expenses while replacing its batteries.

By contrast, an ECP-EOT device uniquely monitors both brake pipe pressure and operating voltages and sends an EOT Beacon every second from its rear unit to its HEU on the controlling locomotive. The HEU will initiate a full service brake application should brake pipe pressure fall below 50 psi or initiate an emergency brake application should a communication loss occur for five consecutive seconds or if there is a break in the train line electrical cable. An ECP-EOT device does not require calibration and its battery, only a back-up for the computer, is charged by the train line cable and is much lighter in weight than the conventional EOT device battery. Physically the last network node in the train, the ECP-EOT device also contains an electronic train line cable circuit--a 50 ohm resistor in series with 0.47 micro-farad capacitor-- and must be connected to the network and transmit status messages to the HEU before the train line cable can be initially powered.

ECP brake systems have the great advantage of real-time monitoring of the brake system's health. In normal operation, the HEU transmits a message/status down the train line cable to each car. If an individual car's brakes do not respond properly to the HEU's brake command, or if air pressures are not within the specified limits for operation, a message indicating the problem and the applicable car number is sent back to the HEU, which in turn notifies the locomotive engineer of the problem. The ECP brake system can identify various faults, including, but not limited to: low brake pipe pressure; low reservoir pressure; low train line cable voltage; low battery charge; incorrect brake cylinder pressure; and offline or inoperative CCDs.

Emergency or full service brake applications automatically occur when the ECP brake system's software detects certain faults. For instance, if the HEU detects that the percentage of operative brakes falls below 85 percent, a full service brake application will automatically occur. In addition, the brakes will automatically apply when the following occurs: (1) Two CCD's or the ECP- EOT report a "Critical Loss" within 5 seconds; (2) the train line cable indicates low voltage with less than 90 percent operative brakes; (3) the ECP- EOT reports a low battery charge; (4) the train moves during set-up; (5) the train line cable becomes disconnected; or (6) the train exceeds 20 mph in Switch Mode. Under the AAR standards, the ECP brake system shall also have a pneumatic back-up system on each car for an emergency brake application in the event of a vented brake pipe or a train separation. These features preserve and exceed the fail safe features of conventional pneumatic brake systems.

IV. Interoperability

Due to control methodology differences, ECP brake systems are not functionally compatible with conventional pneumatic air brake systems. For instance, while conventional pneumatic air brake systems command a brake application by reducing the air pressure in the brake pipe, ECP brake systems command a brake application through a digital communications link transmitted on the electrical train line cable.

Manufacturers have developed application strategies to address issues relating to car and locomotive fleet interchangeability. In particular, they have proposed three major schemes of ECP brake design: stand-alone systems using only ECP brakes; overlay (dual mode) systems capable of operating in either conventional or ECP brake mode; and emulation systems, also capable of operating in either conventional or ECP brake mode.

Since cars with stand-alone ECP brake systems do not include a fully pneumatic brake control valve, they are incompatible with conventionally braked cars and must be operated in train sets depending solely upon ECP brakes. Cars using stand-alone ECP brake systems cannot intermix in the same train with cars using conventional pneumatic brakes unless (1) the train uses ECP brakes and those cars using conventional pneumatic brakes are transported as cars with inoperative brakes or (2) the train uses conventional pneumatic brakes and the cars using ECP brakes are transported as cars with inoperative brakes. While the stand-alone ECP brake system is the least expensive alternative of the three design types, its incompatibility with conventional pneumatic brake systems requires train segregation, potentially posing significant operational problems until the entire car fleet is converted to ECP brakes.

Overlay configurations--cars equipped with both ECP CCDs and conventional pneumatic control valve portions--allow cars to operate with either ECP or conventional pneumatic brakes. To operate in ECP brake mode, compatible ECP equipment must be installed on the locomotive as well as on the freight car. While an overlay system's dual mode capability provides significant flexibility, railroad operators must purchase, install, and maintain equipment to support both types of brake systems for as long as dual mode capability is required.

Emulation configurations use a CCD capable of operating in either ECP or conventional mode without requiring conventional pneumatic controls. One manufacturer has provided an emulation ECP brake valve that monitors both the digital communications cable and the brake pipe for a brake command. If an electrical signal is present, the ECP brake valve operates in ECP brake mode. If the electrical brake command signal is not present, then the valve will monitor the changes in the brake pipe pressure like a conventional pneumatic control valve and the CCD will use a software program to emulate the function and response of a conventional pneumatic valve. An emulation ECP brake system can be operated in any train with any mix of emulation ECP and conventional brake systems. In a mixed train, the emulation ECP brake system will monitor the brake pipe for pressure changes and set up brake cylinder pressure like a conventional pneumatic valve.

In the NPRM, FRA did not propose any rules uniquely regulating trains or cars equipped with emulation ECP brake systems, but sought comments on whether or how it should regulate such systems differently than what was proposed. According to NYAB and Wabtec (collectively, the brake manufacturers), the current AAR standards do not require a pneumatic emulation mode, and this function should not be subject to FRA regulation. In the event future releases of the S-4200 specifications add pneumatic emulation as a requirement, the brake manufacturers suggest that the need for FRA regulation can be addressed at that time. FRA concurs and the final rule does not include regulations uniquely affecting emulation ECP brake systems.

Manufacturers have also addressed ECP brake compatibility with locomotives equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes, which must be equipped with an HEU unit to operate the brakes on cars equipped with ECP brakes. For instance, one manufacturer has developed a portable unit that will allow a locomotive lacking an ECP brake HEU to operate a train equipped with ECP brakes by converting the air pressure changes in the brake pipe to digital command signals that are transmitted to the freight cars through the electrical train line cable. The locomotive engineer operates the brakes with the conventional automatic brake valve in the control cab. The brakes,

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however, will respond instantaneously and provide all of the benefits of an ECP brake system. While FRA recognizes that the technology for such a portable unit is in development and may provide a possible solution to the technological transition, it is not addressed or authorized by this final rule and the incorporated AAR standards.

V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over Conventional Pneumatic Brakes

ECP brake technology overcomes many of the physical limitations inherent in conventional pneumatic brake technology. Field testing of AAR compliant ECP brake systems over the past decade has not revealed any indication of a catastrophic event that could be caused by an ECP brake system malfunctioning. With a high level of confidence, the ECP brake stake holders support the implementation of ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads. FRA concludes that the advantages of ECP brake technology will significantly improve the safety and the performance of train operations. Examples of such benefits include better train handling through simultaneous brake applications, continuous brake pipe charging, and graduated brake operation. Derailments are expected to decline significantly. ECP brake benefits also include electronic train management, improved performance, and real time diagnostics of the train's brake system.

A. Simultaneous Brake Application

The conventional pneumatic brake system uses compressed air as the source for braking power and as the medium for communicating brake application and release commands and communicates the brake commands by changing brake pipe pressure through the use of the locomotive's automatic brake valve. These commands begin at the front of the train and propagate to the rear of the train at the speed of the air pressure moving from car to car. This slow propagation of the brake command contributes to uneven braking, excessive in- train and run-in forces, train handling challenges, longer stopping distances, safety risks of prematurely depleting air brake reservoirs, and a corresponding low brake rate until all cars in the train receive and fully respond to the brake command. FRA recognizes that the slow application and release of brakes in a train, causes excessive in-train forces, which have the potential to cause derailments when they occur in curves, cross-overs, or when heavier cars are placed at the rear of the train or after empty cars. When the brakes on the rear of the train release much more slowly than the brakes on the front of the train, the potential for a "string-line" derailment--where the train stretches out until one or more wheels are lifted off the inside rail of a curve--increases.

The ECP brake system reduces these problems by enabling cars to brake simultaneously at the command of an electronic signal. The electronic signal's speed ensures an instantaneous, simultaneous, and even activation of each car's brake valves, significantly reducing braking distances--40 to 60 percent for the longest trains--and minimizing the consequences of collisions or derailments by reducing the collision speed and slowing the non-derailed portion of the train.

B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging

Propagating a brake command signal through the reduction or increase of air pressure in the brake pipe represents a significant limitation of conventional pneumatic brakes. The same brake pipe air used to propagate brake commands also charges reservoirs on each freight car. As a result, the brake pipe must be fully charged to restore full braking capacity to depleted reservoirs. Partially depleted air from the brake pipe, which occurs during the initial stage of braking, prohibits repeat applications of brakes until the brake pipe can be recharged. A brake pipe can only be recharged once the brakes have been fully released. This characteristic of conventional pneumatic brakes contributes to the risk of run-away trains caused by prematurely depleted brake pipe pressure, particularly on steep grades.

The ECP brake system reduces this risk by continuously charging the brake pipe. Since ECP brakes do not use the brake pipe as a brake command medium, the brake pipe is constantly being charged, allowing the locomotive engineer to operate the brake system more aggressively. With ECP brake systems, it is unnecessary to apply hand brakes on steep grades to recharge the brake pipe after the train stops on the grade.

C. Graduated Brake Application and Release

The conventional pneumatic brake system's inability to operate freight trains in graduated release has long hampered train operations and has increased fuel consumption. The conventional pneumatic brake system can only operate in direct release, preventing locomotive engineers from reducing the braking effort without completely releasing and resetting the brakes. In other words, after a direct release brake application with a conventional pneumatic brake system, braking effort can be increased but not decreased without fully releasing the brakes. In many cases, direct release leads to unnecessary train stops or insufficient initial brake applications. ECP brake systems overcome this deficiency by operating in graduated release, which enables the operator to reduce braking effort to a lower level after making a brake application without fully releasing the brakes. As a result, the operator can accurately adjust the braking level as each situation requires, eliminating the stops required to recharge and reset the brakes after excessive brake applications and prior to negotiating hills and valleys.

D. Train Management

The use of a train line cable allows real-time self-diagnostic functions to be incorporated in the brake system. The initial check of brake system conditions on each car and continuous monitoring of each car's braking functions provides immediate communication to the locomotive engineer of certain brake failures. The continuous monitoring of each car's braking functions and real-time diagnostics of the train's brake system is a significant advantage to the locomotive engineer for the operation of the train. These technical benefits also justify elimination of some of the currently required physical inspections of the train's brake system and support regulatory change to operate cars with non-functioning brakes out of the initial terminal. When the ECP brake system diagnostics detect a serious problem, including when the brake pipe pressure falls below 50 psi, the ECP brake system will automatically command a penalty brake application. ECP brake systems also eliminate the conventional pneumatic brake system's inability to apply all brakes in the train when there is a blockage in the brake pipe, which is handled through the use of a two-way EOT telemetry device not required by all trains. This failure will not affect brake applications in ECP brake systems, because each car is provided a braking command through a train line cable, not solely through the reduction of brake pipe pressure, which would not be propagated through the consist if the brake pipe is blocked. Therefore, ECP brake systems incorporate features that make them inherently safer than conventional pneumatic brakes. Using sensor-based technology to maintain a continuous feedback loop on train condition for the crew and any centralized monitoring, the electrical communication cable network can also serve as a platform for the gradual

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addition of other train performance monitoring and management controls, including distributed power locomotive control, hand brake on/off detection system, automatic activation and release of hand brakes, hot bearing detection, and truck oscillation and vibration. These and other train management features will increase the reliability and overall safety of train operations.

E. Improved Performance

Ultimately, ECP brake technology also provides improved performance, which will contribute to safer train operations and significant cost savings over time. Since trains operated with ECP brakes can operate in graduated release, instead of direct release, fuel will not be wasted while pulling trains against a heavy brake application. Further, because all of the cars' ECP brakes release simultaneously, fuel will not be wasted on initial start-ups and power-ups after a brake release.

Operations utilizing ECP brake systems also promise increased average train speeds and decreased trip times. ECP brake systems allow the locomotive engineer to modulate the brake applications in territories with descending grades, thus increasing overall trip average speeds and reaching destinations sooner. While the slow release of the rear cars' brakes on conventional pneumatic braked trains cause drag, the brakes on ECP brake-equipped trains release simultaneously, improving start-up and acceleration times. Further, due to their shorter stopping distances, trains equipped solely with ECP brake systems may potentially permit higher train speeds within existing signal spacing, which will increase average system velocity, or permit use of shorter "blocks" between signals, facilitating greater system capacity.

The instantaneous application and release of ECP brakes will result in more uniform braking, thus improving wheel wear and increasing brake shoe life. In a conventional pneumatically braked train, the brake pipe gradient and slower response time causes the first third of the train's cars to provide the majority of the braking action, thus applying additional pressure and heat on those cars' wheels. Since ECP brake systems provide instantaneous braking on all cars, such pressure will be more uniformly distributed along the train, thus eliminating the uneven braking force on the wheels of those leading cars. The ECP brake system also self-monitors each car's brake cylinder pressure and maintains the prescribed pressure, thus reducing the potential for creating shelling and flat spots on wheels.

Due to minimized wheel defects, and their accompanying vibrations, freight cars and brake components will enjoy increased life. Further, instantaneous braking will also prevent draft gear assemblies from receiving the constant pressure caused by trains equipped with conventional pneumatic brake systems and will reduce lading damage by eliminating slack action and in-train forces caused by uneven braking. ECP brake systems will also reduce the number of brake parts and rubber diaphragms required by conventional pneumatic brake systems.

VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing

During the past 18 years, FRA has monitored the progression of ECP brake technology and has observed field testing on various revenue trains, both freight and passenger. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR initiative to develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded, through the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a FMECA of the ECP brake system based on AAR's Standards and Recommended Practices, S-4200 Series. FRA also participated in programs to develop and enhance advanced components for ECP brake systems. After all of these efforts, FRA has determined that the AAR S- 4200 Series of standards are appropriate substantively and legally for incorporation by reference in this rule and that the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee is an appropriate vehicle to rely upon in the implementation of ECP brake technology for this rule. FRA acknowledges that ECP brakes are an attractive, viable, and enabling technology with the potential to substantially improve the operational efficiency of trains and that by complying with AAR Standard S-4200, ECP braked trains offer significant safety and efficiency benefits in freight train handling, car maintenance, fuel savings, network capacity, self-monitoring, and fail-safe operation.

AAR administers the existing industry ECP brake standards through its Air Brake Systems Committee--consisting of representatives from the major railroads, brake manufacturers, and FRA--which requires demonstrated proof of compatibility, safety, and reliability of air brake systems to receive AAR approval. FRA is satisfied that the existing AAR S-4200 Series specifications, AAR approval procedures, and continuing oversight by the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee will best ensure the safety and reliability of ECP brake systems. An ECP brake monitoring system complying with AAR Standard S-4200 Series increases safety by communicating information on the location and quantity of defective equipment and by providing for the safe movement of equipment over longer distances and periods of time.

A. AAR Standards and Approval Process

In order to assure the safety and the interoperability of ECP brake system designs, AAR developed the S-4200 Series of standards. The first five standards (S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230, and S-4250)--issued in 1999 and updated in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007--specify the functional, operational, and interface requirements for cable-based ECP brake systems. AAR issued two additional standards in January 2007, specifying ECP brake equipment approval procedures (S-4240) and interoperability testing requirements (S-4260). In April 2008, AAR issued a standard for hardware and software configuration management plans (S-4270). At this time, AAR has not completed specifications for radio-based ECP brakes, which it considers technically immature and unsuitable. The purposes of the standards are to ensure that AAR-approved electronic brake systems are interoperable between different manufacturers and meet high standards of safety and reliability. The analysis of the S-4200 Series of standards indicates that the performance specifications for the cable-based ECP brake concept are complete.

The AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices (MSRP) contain the following standards for cable-based ECP brake systems:

. S-4200, ECP Cable-Based Brake Systems--Performance requirements;

. S-4210, ECP Cable-Based Brake System Cable, Connectors, and Junctions Boxes--Performance Specifications;

. S-4220, ECP Cable-Based Brake DC Power Supply--Performance Specification;

. S-4230, Intratrain Communication Specification for Cable-Based Freight Train Control System;

. S-4240, ECP Brake Equipment--Approval Procedure;

. S-4250, Performance Requirements for ITC Controlled Cable-Based Distributed Power Systems;

. S-4260, ECP Brake and Wire Distributed Power Interoperability Test Procedures; and

. S-4270, ECP Brake System Configuration Management.

Standard S-4200 ensures that the functionality and performance of freight ECP brake systems are uniform and

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consistent among equipment from different manufacturers, that cars equipped with AAR-approved ECP brake systems from different manufacturers are interoperable, and that AAR-approved electronic brake systems meet a high standard of safety and reliability. This standard defines ECP brake system elements, specifies their functionality in different implementation schemes-- such as stand-alone, overlays, and emulators--and sets the requirements for all system functions. It covers all primary functions of ECP brakes, including graduated brake application and releases, continuous reservoir charging, adjustment of braking level to car load, continuous fault detection, equipment status monitoring, and pneumatic backup. It also specifies requirements for all modes of train operation and provides an extensive description of fault response and recovery functions for all possible faults of the system components. The standard also establishes environmental requirements for the designed systems, in-service testing, and rigorous approval procedures for the certification process of new ECP brake equipment.

Other standards in the AAR S-4200 Series contain requirements for critical ECP brake system components and communication protocols. Standard S-4210 contains the performance specifications and qualification test procedures for ECP brake system cables, connectors, and end-of-car junction boxes. The required testing verifies that the designed components have high reliability, will withstand harsh environmental conditions, and will have at least an 8- year operating life.

Standard S-4220 contains performance specifications for the DC power supply system through the hard-wired train line cable for ECP brake controllers and other electronic freight car components. Since a DC power supply conductor will also send communication control commands between a locomotive and its attached cars, the standard requires reliable separation and absence of interference between the DC power supply and the communication circuits.

Standard S-4230 contains the requirements related to intra-train communication systems on freight equipment used in revenue interchange service. The standard facilitates interoperability between freight cars and locomotives without limiting the proprietary design approaches used by individual suppliers. The communication protocol was developed for control of ECP brakes and multiple remote units, including distributed power locomotives, and for safety reporting of various car and locomotive components.

Standard S-4250 contains the methodology and communication flow requirements for controlling the operation of multiple locomotives in a freight consist through the intra-train communication network that is shared with ECP brake system. The locomotive control through the intra-train communication line is an alternative method of locomotive control, which was not available before the introduction of ECP brake system technology. The controlled locomotives can either trail a lead locomotive or be distributed (i.e., separated by cars) in a train. The standard establishes protocols for different types of locomotive controls through the intra-train line cable, depending on the location of the consist's multiple locomotives. While the current means of controlling "distributed power" is performed through radio control--which is susceptible to a loss of communication and is not "fail safe" in operation--locomotives operated with ECP brake systems can be relied upon to function as commanded in real time and automatically apply the brakes in the event of a communication loss.

Standard S-4260 contains the test procedures that must be completed by ECP brake manufacturers to establish interoperability baselines among ECP brake and wire distributed power (WDP) systems in compliance with the S-4200 standards series. The test procedures validate the functional interoperability of ECP brake and WDP systems developed by different manufacturers.

Standard S-4270 defines the procedures for managing the software and hardware configuration for AAR-approved ECP brake systems.

The AAR approval process and the work of the Air Brake Systems Committee has been the primary method of ensuring the safety and reliability of railroad brake systems and components for decades. Through its participation on the Air Brake Systems Committee, FRA can monitor any safety or reliability issues that may develop with ECP brake systems. In the event of a serious safety issue with a supplier's ECP brake system, FRA can appropriately respond by invoking its authority to intervene with additional rulemaking or an emergency order. FRA does not expect to use this authority, because the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee already has the authority to rescind AAR approval for brake systems that do not perform safely or reliably.

Standard S-4240 contains the acceptance procedure for seeking AAR approval of ECP brake equipment. The standard requires a manufacturer to apply for approval by submitting certain information under Administrative Standard S- 060. Following review and approval of the initial application data and test plan by the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee, a manufacturer maintains the burden of establishing compliance with Standards S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S- 4230, S-4250, S-4260, and S-4270 to obtain conditional approval.

For laboratory testing, an AAR representative will select 150 CCDs from a lot of 200 and will select HEUs, train power supplying units (TPSs), and ECP- EOTs from lots of four each. The testing will be performed on a 150-car test rack configured in accordance with AAR specifications. The manufacturer will provide for AAR evaluation of the test results, which shall include a requirements traceability and compliance matrix for each AAR standard and all necessary test reports, and then conduct interoperability laboratory testing between new ECP brake equipment and AAR-approved ECP brake equipment in accordance with standard S-4260.

Upon satisfactory completion of the aforementioned laboratory tests, AAR will consider conditional approval for field testing of ECP brake equipment. If conditional approval is granted, 150 ECP brake CCDs shall be selected from a production lot of 200 test-approved CCDs, and 100 of those selected, plus at least two ECP brake-equipped locomotives and one ECP-EOT device, must be placed in railroad service for 24 months. Under conditional approval, at least 1,000 cars must be allotted for use. Within those 24 months, all in-service tests must be conducted. After those 24 months, the Air Brake Systems Committee continues to monitor the product for reliability and safety concerns. If a problem with any brake component is discovered, the Committee will discuss the issue and may either demand further tests or withdraw AAR approval.

Full AAR approval shall be provided after 4 years if during that time a manufacturer furnishes AAR at specified intervals various service reports, which must include accurate ECP brake equipment malfunction records. FRA agrees with AAR's assessment that 4 years are needed to collect a history of reliable data with minimum failures. In addition, the manufacturer must provide to AAR a semiannual report containing any repair material for the test ECP brake equipment. Under the standard, AAR reserves the right to withdraw

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conditional test approval if it determines that safety is impaired, reliability degrades, or incompatibility of ECP brake operation develops, and may require any additional testing or performance evaluations it deems necessary. Standard S-4240 also contains specific procedures that must be followed when a manufacturer intends to change certain ECP brake equipment physical characteristics, software, or electronics.

FRA supports this effort as a timely measure for AAR to strengthen the regulatory package for ECP brake systems. Overall, FRA considers AAR approval a valuable step to ensure the reliability and safety of ECP brake systems and a minimum requirement for initial application of ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads. However, FRA fully intends to monitor the application and safety of ECP and may, at its discretion, require additional safety analysis to be performed to confirm the safety of ECP brake systems installed and operating in revenue service. FRA reserves the right to witness the AAR approval testing of the product.

B. FMECA

AAR Standard S-4200 Series was developed to support the design of a safer, more reliable ECP braking system when compared with conventional air brakes. Once the standard was created, the railroad industry identified the need to perform a safety and reliability assessment of an ECP brake system built in accordance with this standard. Since actual S-4200 Series compliant ECP brake systems did not yet exist, the industry decided to conduct a FMECA for a hypothetical ECP brake system that satisfied all the requirements of the standard. At FRA's insistence, the FMECA on AAR Standard S-4200 was performed in 1999 by DEL Engineering with participation of AAR, FRA and a number of experts with significant experience in the development and application of ECP brake systems.

The FMECA team began the analysis by identifying all major ECP brake system components and their intended functions. The analysis examined each component and function and identified associated failure modes and effects. The failure modes were analyzed to determine severity, frequency of occurrence, and effectiveness of detection. The FMECA team created a numeric ranking criterion and determined and prioritized the level of risk posed by each failure mode. High-risk failure modes were identified and appropriate mitigation strategies were developed to decrease the risk.

The FMECA team analyzed the failure modes of all ECP brake components, including: CCDs with the battery; HEUs on the head locomotive; ECP-EOT devices; train line cables, communication and power supplies; power supply controllers; head end line terminators; car ID modules; locomotive ID modules; and operative brakes. The analysis included different types of ECP brake systems, including stand alone, overlay (dual mode), and emulator and all system functional requirements and operating modes, including Initialization, Switch, Run, and Cut-out. The FMECA failure log contained about 1,500 failure modes. For each high-risk failure mode, the FMECA team identified action items and offered recommendations on how to mitigate the consequences of component failures or system functional failures. The team primarily examined single- point failures but also identified and evaluated some cases of combined failures that had significant safety consequences.

The FMECA results confirmed that the ECP brake concept offers the potential for improved performance, reliability, and safety over that of conventional pneumatic brake systems. The FMECA concluded that no failure mode of an AAR- compliant ECP brake system exists that can cause a catastrophic accident due to single-point failure of the system itself. The AAR standards, as written, eliminate or mitigate critical outcomes of single-point failure of ECP brake systems.

The FMECA team encouraged manufacturers to pursue ECP brake technology, because the potential safety and efficiency benefits will far outweigh any disadvantages. If designed and maintained properly, ECP brakes will be substantially safer and more reliable than the conventional pneumatic brake system they are intended to replace. AAR and the brake manufacturers indicated that they were completely satisfied that ECP brake systems are significantly safer than conventional pneumatic systems. They accepted the results of the FMECA and concluded that no modifications were necessary to the AAR standards related to ECP brake systems.

VII. Market Maturity and Implementation

The U.S. market for ECP brake systems is mature enough to begin implementation of ECP brake technology. The equipment manufacturers have made a significant investment in the technology and have completed the preliminary design work and field testing of ECP brakes. For instance, they have provided technical solutions for different ECP brake implementation strategies, enabling non-ECP and ECP brake-equipped cars to run in combined trains and, in some cases, allowing ECP brake-equipped freight cars to run in ECP brake mode using locomotives with conventional pneumatic brake systems. In addition, they are ready to supply fully operational stand-alone ECP brake systems, overlays, and emulators for the U.S. market, easing the industry's migration process. A commitment by the railroad industry to change over to ECP brakes is necessary to inspire additional technological initiatives by the manufacturers.

ECP brake systems from the main U.S. manufacturers--all in different stages of AAR approval and testing in revenue service--have been built with the intention of complying with the AAR S-4200 Series of standards, proven safe through field testing, designed using fail-safe principles, and accommodated the industry's need for different implementation schemes. The AAR S-4200 Series standards are intended to assure the necessary level of safety, reliability, interoperability, and ultimately the applicability of this equipment in the U.S. market. The equipment of existing ECP brake manufacturers incorporates the conventional pneumatic emergency brake system as a backup in case of failure of the ECP brake control. In most cases, ECP brake systems will support enhanced safety even if the electronics fail, because continuous recharging of the brake pipe will ensure availability of an emergency application. Therefore, the ECP brake system reduces the risk caused by depleted air in the case of an emergency. There is no instance or record of a malfunctioning ECP brake system that resulted in a catastrophic or critical event.

To assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail freight industry, FRA contracted with BAH in 2005 to conduct a study. An ECP brake expert panel of principal stakeholders in the conversion of the U.S. freight car fleet to ECP brake technology, including suppliers, railroads, private car owners, AAR, and FRA was assembled to participate in the study. The expert panel supported the conclusion that the AAR standards are sufficient for the ECP brake system designer to achieve a system safety level adequate for a safety-critical system. In particular, an AAR-compliant system, while providing a significant increase in safety and efficiency, does not introduce extra risks associated with single-point failure of the ECP system itself.

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The final BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and comparison of ECP and conventional air brake systems. BAH acknowledged that while trains with ECP brake systems have been operated in North America, South Africa, and Australia, U.S. implementation has been stalled due to the absence of an acceptable implementation plan for conversion and hard data to support a sound economic analysis, limited interoperability with traditionally braked trains, and insufficient capital investment required for conversion. It concluded that although the barriers to implementation are formidable, ECP brake systems are economically and technically ripe for adoption and should be implemented in phases. BAH suggests that implementing ECP brakes on 2,800 locomotives and 80,000 cars in the Powder River Basin (PRB) would cost the industry approximately $432 million. However, according to BAH, the annual $157 million in anticipated benefits--resulting from saved fuel, improved wheel and brake shoe life, and a reduction in necessary brake inspections--will allow railroads to recover those costs in less than three years. To justify the investment, the BAH report says, conversion must be focused first on the high- mileage, unit-train-type services that would most benefit from its use.

FRA acknowledges that BAH's fuel cost estimates are underestimated due to subsequently rising prices. It is notable that BAH did not attempt to quantify potential savings relating to capacity increases or emissions decreases due to the difficulty in arriving at acceptable values. Accordingly, the report's estimated internal rate of return should be viewed as conservative.

VIII. Related Proceeding

In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006, BNSF and NS jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in parts 229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP brake pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. The FRA Safety Board held a fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake manufacturers, and labor unions. On March 21, 2007, the Safety Board granted the petitioners' request, in part, subject to various conditions designed to ensure that ECP brake equipped trains subject to the waiver will be as safe as trains equipped with conventional brakes and operated under the existing rules. See id.

IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed Relief

ECP brake operation provides for continuous electronic monitoring of the condition of air brake system components and brake pipe pressure, potentially limiting the need for certain physical brake inspections currently required under part 232. Accordingly, this final rule modifies, relaxes, and removes certain requirements, including intermediate terminal inspections ([Subsection] 232.207, 232.209, and 232.211), single-car air brake tests ( [Section] 232.305), and the required percent of operable brakes at initial terminal departure ( [Section] 232.103(d)), as they apply to trains operating in ECP brake mode. The rail industry's implementation of ECP brakes is frustrated by such inapplicable and inefficient statutory and regulatory requirements. Without a large-scale proliferation and implementation of ECP brake technologies, the industry will not be able to enjoy economies of scale and to overcome the industry-wide limits caused by interoperability problems. FRA seeks to improve market efficiency by providing reliable and suitable standards and procedures that will support investments in ECP brake technology.

The current statutory and regulatory requirements, however--including those concerning brake inspections and the operation of trains with defective equipment--may reduce or eliminate incentives for railroads to implement new ECP brake technology and take advantage of its operational and safety benefits. For example, 49 U.S.C. 20303 presents an obstacle to cost-saving, safe, and efficient long hauls promised by ECP brakes. To avoid incurring civil penalties, operators are required under 49 U.S.C. 20303 to transport rail vehicles with defective or insecure equipment "from the place at which the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available place at which the repairs can be made."

The design and operation of ECP brakes renders strict application of the existing statutory movement for repair provision unnecessary as it will reduce efficiencies and may actually reduce the safety of such operations. When the defective equipment is an ECP brake, stopping for immediate repairs is not necessary. If more than 15 percent of the train's AAR approved ECP brakes become inoperable, the train automatically stops. It should be noted that a train with 85 percent operative ECP brakes will still have shorter stopping distances than a train equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes that are 100 percent operative. Considering the technology's continuous self-monitoring and constant communication with the engineer, it is highly unlikely that a train equipped with ECP brakes will ever reach such a level of inoperability. Further, FRA continues to believe that a freight train operated with ECP brakes may travel non-stop to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, without intermediate brake inspections, because foundation brake rigging and brake shoes will safely operate this distance and redundant intermediate brake inspections within that distance do not increase ECP brake system safety. As an added benefit, the increased mileage allowance would provide for coast-to- coast travel. In the related proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, FRA's Safety Board granted the request of BNSF and NS to allow the non-stop movement of an ECP brake operated train to its destination, each not to exceed 3,500 miles.

Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. 20303 requires trains with defective safety appliances, including brakes, to travel to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made. If the nearest available location is in a direction other than that in which the train is traveling, the train with defective equipment may be required to switch the defective car out of the train and add it to another train traveling in the direction of the nearest repair location, referred to as a "backhaul." ECP brake implementation has been complicated by the ECP brakes system's technological incompatibility with conventional pneumatic brake systems. To switch a car equipped with ECP brakes into a technologically incompatible train operating with conventional pneumatic brakes will create additional safety concerns for that train.

The potential risks involved in combining cars with incompatible braking systems coupled with the hazards normally associated in switching cars in the field, outweigh the potential harm of keeping the defective car in its existing ECP braked train and traveling to a repair location that is significantly further away. In circumstances where the defective safety appliance is a non-brake defect, it will often be safer and is certainly more efficient to allow ECP brake-equipped trains with non-brake defective equipment to travel to the nearest forward repair station. Moreover, due to the ability of ECP brake systems to continuously monitor the brakes on each car in a train and to provide specific information to the locomotive engineer regarding the location of any car with inoperative brakes and the

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design of such systems to prohibit operation with less than 85 percent operative brakes in certain situations, the need to immediately set-out and handle cars with defective brakes for repair is unnecessary. There is also no safety need to require a railroad to incur the expense and delay involved with cutting the defective car out of the train or to run the safety risk of doing so. Currently, freight cars with defective mechanical conditions are permitted to be hauled long distances for repair. See 49 CFR 215.9. In light of the technological advances provided by ECP brake systems, it appears logical and necessary to permit more flexibility in moving equipment with defective brakes when equipped with ECP brakes and hauled in a train operating in ECP brake mode. However, the language of 49 U.S.C. 20303 prevents FRA from providing this flexibility.

When drafting the proposed rule in this proceeding, FRA recognized that the aforementioned statutory requirements governing conventional pneumatic braked trains may offset the increased safety and efficiency benefits afforded by ECP brakes, thus eliminating the incentives for rail operators to implement ECP brake technologies. To encourage implementation without hindering safety, FRA proposed to invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt ECP brake-equipped trains from the specific statutory requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303. The requirements for moving defective equipment were created over a century ago, during the infancy of pneumatic brakes and before all cars were equipped with power brakes. With many more reasons to stop train operation along tracks with frequent repair shops and exponentially more employees, the legislative drafters of that time could not have envisioned the type of safer and more efficient technologies available today.

Recognizing the importance of upgrading rail technologies, Congress in 1980 passed the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (the "Rock Island Act"), which, inter alia, provides statutory relief for the implementation of new technologies. More specifically, when certain statutory requirements preclude the development or implementation of more efficient railroad transportation equipment or other transportation innovations, the applicable section of the Rock Island Act, currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20306, provides the Secretary of Transportation with the authority to grant an exemption to those requirements based on evidence received and findings developed at a hearing.

According to Senate Report No. 96-614, "This section fosters rail technological improvements by giving the Federal Railroad Administration discretionary authority to grant exemptions from the Safety Appliance Acts' mandatory requirements when those requirements preclude the development or implementation of new rail technology. " Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 96-614, at 8-9 (Mar. 4, 1980) (emphases added). The House version of the bill includes no similar provision, but the Conference substitute adds that the authority granted FRA in this section must be exercised after a hearing, absent an agreement between labor representatives and the developers or operators of the new equipment or technology. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1041, [Section] 117, at 30 (May 20, 1980).

Under 49 CFR 1.49(v), the Federal Railroad Administrator is delegated authority to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by the Rock Island Act. Under this authority, FRA held two public oral hearings in Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and near Chicago, IL, on October 19, 2007, to receive evidence and develop findings to determine whether FRA should invoke 49 U.S.C. 20306. While FRA solicited any information that would bear on this decision, it also asked a series of questions in the NPRM and at the hearing designed to invoke discussion and gather information regarding the safety of moving defective equipment as proposed and to determine whether existing statutory provisions impede the implementation of the technology.

At the hearing, the labor unions commented on the limitations of the ECP brake system's self-monitoring capabilities. According to the labor unions, since the technology cannot monitor a variety of brake defects, it should not be relied upon to allow a train to operate 3,500 miles without any intermediate brake inspections. On the other hand, the railroads support the increase in the allowable distance of 3,500 miles between brake inspections, believing the safety level of trains operating with ECP brakes that distance should equal or exceed the safety level of trains operating with conventional brakes over 1,000 miles. For the same reasons, some railroads even suggested that ECP brake operated trains be allowed to move 5,000 miles between Class I brake inspections.

The labor unions and railroads agree that a conventional freight car with the brakes cut out is no different than an ECP brake-equipped car with the brakes cut out and that switching a defective ECP brake-equipped car into a conventionally braked train will not increase current safety concerns. However, the railroads and the labor unions disagree when the defect is a non- brake safety appliance on a car equipped with ECP brakes. According to the labor unions, if a non-brake defect requires the car to be set out, there is no difference between a train operated with conventional brakes and a train operated with ECP brakes; the car should be set out for repair on site or moved under special circumstances to the nearest repair point. The railroads believe that such cars should be left in the train operated with ECP brakes for forward movement to a location where ECP brake repairs can be made instead of being switched out and hauled in a different direction. Any switching, says the railroads, causes the switching and pick-up crews more risk exposure.

The labor unions assert that the regulations proposed in this proceeding provide sufficient incentives for the implementation of ECP brake systems and that the restrictions within 49 U.S.C. 20303 do not provide a disincentive for such implementation. The railroads, on the other hand, assert that strict application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 provides a disincentive for the implementation and use of ECP brake technologies. According to the railroads, they are required under section 20303 to handle cars with defective equipment more times than necessary, resulting in lost time and revenue. The resulting undue and unreasonable financial burden and significantly negative financial impact on rail operations, say the railroads, provides no relief from the added expense of equipping rail cars with ECP brakes and is a strong disincentive for ECP brake system implementation. The railroads claim that eliminating the requirements under 49 U.S.C. 20303 would provide a necessary and significant economic incentive to the widespread adoption of ECP braking technology in the U.S.

Based on the comments and information submitted at those hearings, FRA has decided to invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 as it applies to the operation of ECP brake operated freight trains and freight cars. FRA believes that application of section 20303 will clearly provide a disincentive towards the implementation of ECP brake systems, a

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technology that promises safer operation of trains throughout the U.S.

FRA is confident that this initiative is consistent with improving railroad safety. As further discussed below, through oversight of present train operations, including extended haul operations, FRA has observed that properly inspected trains can proceed for extended distances without loss of braking effort due to wear or damage to foundation brake rigging. FRA further notes that hauling of cars with defective safety appliances to the next forward point where repairs can be accomplished poses virtually no incremental risk to employees, particularly if defects have been identified and communicated to the crew of the train. In the great majority of cases, damaged or insecure safety appliances pose a risk only during switching operations, not during line haul movements. Indeed, back hauling of safety appliances introduces additional risk, as the car is first removed from one road train and then added to another for the reverse movement.

X. Additional Issues

A. Part 229

In the ECP brake waiver proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, BNSF and NS sought relief from various provisions of parts 229 and 232. In relation to part 229, BNSF and NS sought relief from the requirements relating to daily locomotive inspections and electronic record keeping. FRA sought comments and information whether this final rule should include any exceptions to part 229 for operations using ECP brake systems.

No commenting party supported or suggested any exceptions to part 229. On the contrary, UTU and BLET agreed with the FRA's proposal not to modify part 229 in this rulemaking. According to BLET, there is no basis for relief from the daily inspection or recordkeeping requirements of Part 229. FRA continues to believe that there is insufficient information available to consider any exceptions to part 229 for operations using ECP brake systems. Thus, under this rulemaking, part 229 remains unaffected.

In its comments, Wabtec lists a number of minimum requirements that it proposes should be added to existing event recorder parameters, applicable to the lead locomotive when in ECP brake operation. BLET filed a supplemental response in which it responded to this particular filing, stating that it "cannot serve as a basis for FRA requirements pertaining to event recording of ECP data because of [an] omission [relating to the 'ECP train brake source' parameter described in UP's comments]." The scope of this proceeding does not include information relating to event recorder data. The NPRM did not discuss or seek comments on this issue. Accordingly, FRA will not include in this final rule any modifications to the regulations governing event recorders, since many parties interested in event recorders would not have been put on notice that the issue was being raised. FRA believes that these issues would best be resolved in a separate proceeding concerning part 229.

B. Dynamic Brake Requirements

At the public hearing conducted in relation to the waiver proceeding, BNSF requested relief from some of the dynamic brake requirements contained in 49 CFR part 232. On this issue, FRA only received comments from BLET, which indicated that relief relating to dynamic brake requirement is not necessary as it applies to ECP brake systems. According to BLET, it would be unwise and unsafe to further erode braking capacity by diluting the existing dynamic brake requirements.

FRA remains unsure of what specific relief BNSF requested regarding dynamic brakes. Section 232.109 provides for the continued operation of a locomotive found with inoperative dynamic brakes for a period of up to 30 calendar days. It appears that railroads will continue to require locomotive engineers to rely on extended range dynamic brakes where they sufficiently control the braking effort without introducing excessive buff forces. Locomotive engineers will need to know what level of braking effort is available, particularly in extreme cases operating over territory with significantly descending grades. Otherwise, an engineer may lose control of the train due to brake fade when the speed precludes a timely application of the automatic brake due to insufficient dynamic brake capacity. FRA recognizes that this scenario is much less likely to occur with availability of ECP braking, but that does not mean it could not occur. FRA continues to believe that more flexibility in this area is not necessary and declines to make any such modifications in this final rule.

C. Single Car Air Brake Test Approval Procedures and Single Car Air Brake Tests

The NPRM included a provision requiring the submission and approval of single car air brake test procedures for cars with ECP brake systems in accordance with the special approval procedures in [Section] 232.17. FRA also reserved the right to modify [Section] 232.17 to make clear the applicability of proposed subpart G, including, but not limited to, adding cross-references.

Section 232.305(a) provides that a single car air brake test may be performed partially in accordance with "Section 4.0, 'Special Tests,' of the Association of American Railroads Standard S-486-01, 'Code of Air Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment,' contained in the AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1, 2001)." That standard has since been amended and FRA has approved the use of the new Standard S-486-04 as the procedure to use when performing a single car air brake test. Accordingly, FRA proposed to amend [Section] 232.305(a) by replacing the directly preceding quoted text with the following: "Section 4.0, 'Special Tests,' of the Association of American Railroads Standard S-486-04, 'Code of Air Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment,' contained in the AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1, 2004)."

BLET submitted comments supporting FRA's proposed amendments to sections 232.17 and 232.305(a). No other comments were filed on these issues. Consequently, the final rule amends [Subsection] 232.17 and 232.305(a).

D. Train Handling Information

Section 232.111 requires railroads to adopt and comply with written procedures ensuring that railroad train crews receiving trains are provided accurate information concerning each train's condition. The continuous monitoring capabilities of ECP brake systems provide information regarding the location of equipment with inoperative or cut out brakes. BLET commented that none of the information provided by the ECP brake system appears to satisfy the requirements of 232.111(b) and that it agrees with FRA that there is no reason for excepting any portion of or provision contained in [Section] 232.111.

FRA continues to see no reason to excepting any portion of or provision contained in [Section] 232.111. FRA continues to believe that, if anything, ECP brake systems' continuous monitoring capabilities will assist railroads in complying with the train handling information rules in [Section] 232.111 by monitoring defects and potentially allowing for the manual input of defects not monitored electronically and then

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electronically providing such information to subsequent train crews.

E. Piston Travel Limits

For cars equipped with 81/2-inch or 10-inch diameter brake cylinders receiving either a Class I brake test or a periodic inspection while on a shop or repair track, [Subsection] 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c) currently limit piston travel to 7 to 9 inches. An industry-wide waiver currently in effect, however, permits piston travel limits to range from 6 to 9 inches on these types of cylinders. In the NPRM, FRA proposed the incorporation of that waiver into the rules by amending [Subsection] 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c) accordingly.

BLET, Wabtec, and NYAB concur with FRA's proposal to incorporate the current, industry-wide waiver permitting piston travel limits to range from 6 to 9 inches by amending sections 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c). Similarly, AAR states that there is no reason to refrain from incorporating the industry-wide waiver in the regulations. Consequently, this final rule amends sections 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c) by revising the piston travel range limit of 7 to 9 inches to a range limit of 6 to 9 inches.

F. Extended Haul Trains

Section 232.213(a)(6) requires inbound inspections for extended haul trains and states that, "After April 1, 2007, the inbound inspection described in this paragraph shall not be required unless FRA provides notification to the industry extending the requirement to perform inbound inspections on extended haul trains." Section 232.213(a)(7) requires railroads to maintain a record of all defective, inoperative, or ineffective brakes and all conditions not in compliance with parts 215 and 231 discovered during train movement. In addition, that section says that, "After April 1, 2007, the records described in this paragraph need not be maintained unless FRA provides the notification required in paragraph (a)(6) of this section extending the requirement to conduct inbound inspections on extended haul trains."

In the NPRM, FRA proposed to amend Part 232 by deleting [Subsection] 232.213(a)(6) and (a)(7) from the regulations. These regulations "sunsetted" on April 1, 2007, without further FRA action. Since this proposal remains uncontested and the "sunsetted" provisions serve no purpose by remaining in the CFR, the final rule deletes [Section] 232.213(a)(6) and (a)(7).

G. Part 238

Amtrak informally expressed interest in potentially using ECP brake system technology for its Auto Train that runs from Lorton, Virginia to Sanford, Florida. Amtrak previously employed overlay ECP braking on that train, and presumably would benefit from some additional flexibility with respect to the conduct of intermediate inspections. However, since FRA does not currently have sufficient information regarding the use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains and passenger equipment, FRA did not propose any amendment to 49 CFR part 238. FRA continues to believe that the functions of freight and passenger trains and cars, evidenced by the varied rules applicable to each, are too disparate to provide a one-size-fits-all solution for ECP brake integration and use.

In the NPRM, FRA stated that it may consider Part 238's applicability to ECP brake systems in another rulemaking or in other proceedings and would consider requests for waivers relating to the regulation of freight trains and freight cars equipped with ECP brake systems for passenger trains on a case- by-case basis. BLET agrees that the issue of ECP brakes and Part 238 should be addressed in a separate rulemaking. For this reason, BLET does not believe that it is appropriate for FRA to regulate ECP brakes on passenger trains via the waiver process or on a case-by-case basis.

FRA continues to believe that any regulations affecting the implementation and use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains are better left for a separate rulemaking proceeding relating to Part 238. FRA will also consider requests for waivers for such implementation and use on passenger trains. Although BLET expresses its opinion that a rulemaking would be a better venue for permitting the implementation and use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains, it provides no reasons why it would not be prudent to allow for the use of waivers to achieve similar goals.

XI. Section-by-Section Analysis

49 CFR Part 232

Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA sought comments on all proposals made in the NPRM to this proceeding.

Subpart A--General

This subpart contains amendments to the definitions listed in subpart A of part 232.

Section 232.5 Definitions

In the NPRM, FRA proposed the amendment of section 232.5 by adding an extensive set of definitions to introduce the regulatory relief and regulations applicable to ECP brake systems. FRA worded these definitions to mirror, to the extent possible, the definitions provided in existing AAR standards. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning of important terms that are used in the text of the proposed rule. The definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. Some of the definitions introduce new concepts or new technologies.

These new definitions acknowledge the two general types of ECP brake systems--dual mode and stand-alone. The definition of a dual mode ECP brake system, which means a brake system that can work either as a conventional pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake system, intends to cover both an overlay ECP brake system and an ECP brake system equipped with an emulator CCD. The definition of CCD is intended to describe an important and necessary part of ECP brake system technology.

FRA did not receive any comments on the proposed definitions. Consequently, except for reasons set forth below, the final rule retains the definitions as proposed.

Subpart G--Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems

FRA is adding a new subpart G to part 232. The new subpart contains various design and operational requirements that provide both regulatory relief and regulatory modification to allow implementation of ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads and to ensure the safety of such operations.

Section 232.601 Scope

This section contains a formal statement of the final rule's purpose and scope. The final rule contains specific requirements relating to the operation of freight trains and freight cars equipped with ECP brake systems and operating in ECP brake mode. The final rule also provides specific exceptions from various requirements contained in part 232 for ECP brake-equipped freight trains and freight cars.

Section 232.602 Applicability

As a general matter, this section makes clear that these rules apply to all railroads that operate freight trains or freight cars equipped with ECP brakes on track which is part of the general railroad system of transportation. The final rule applies to freight trains

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operating in ECP brake mode, freight cars equipped with ECP brake systems, and conventionally braked freight trains and freight cars when operated in conjunction with ECP brake equipment.

The regulatory relief provided in the final rule and the need to ensure the safe oper